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En 1912 Henry Goddard. a psychologist from
Vineland, New Jersey. was invited by the United
States Public Health Service to Ellis Island.
where he applied a translation of the Binet Mental
Test to arriving European immigrants. He reported
that 79 per cent of the Italians, 80 per cent of the
Hungarians, 83 per cent of the Jews, and 87 per
cent of the Russians were "feeble minded". Five
years later in 1917 the use of mental tests "for the
detection of feeble minded aliens" had vastly
increased the number of aliens deported.'
Since their inception in 1905 when Binet and
Simon were commissioned by the Minister of
Public Instruction in Paris to design a test to
identify children who were likely to fail in school.
mental tests have arisen out of, legitimated, and
reinforced aspects of the social order (e.g. income
and race differences). The assumption behind
many mental tests is that the personal dimension
being tapped is of an innate, fixed nature and
therefore largely unalterable under different
social/environmental conditions. The development
and modificatiön of tests purporting to measure
intelligencedefined variously as "an abstract
reasoning ability" (Jensen 1969), "an innate general
cognitive ability" (Burt 1921)does involve the
assumption that the full potential of any individ-
ual's development is limited by genic constraints
laid down at the moment of conception.
The question of the genetic or enviromental
determination of human development has always
been controversial. Psychologists and social coni-
mentators like Burt. Jensen and Herrnstein. argue
that up to 85 per cent of individual differences in
intelligence are accounted for by genetic factors.
A more moderate estimate is made by Jencks.
After a survey of all available data he concludes:
"Our analysis of heritability suggests that the
data base for making generalizations about the
heritability of IQ scores is till too weak to justify
a precise estimate. Our best guess is that genotype
explains about 45 per cent of the variance in IQ
scores" (1972). Others, like Borstelmann (1968).
present an environmentalist position: that indi-
vidual differences are explained by environmental
factors.
The nature-nurture, genetic-environmental con-
troversy is usually accompanied in the mind of
the reader by the right-wing/left-wing political
J Historical evidence quoted in Kamin, L. (1973).
constructnot surprisingly in many cases. Indeed,
the actors at the centre of the debate, the persons
who present the data, are not immune from politi-
cal attitudes. As early as 1949, Pastore reviewed
the writings of people concerned with the nature-
nurture issue and found that the data presented,
conclusions drawn and implications for society
were heavily associated with their political and
social attitudes. But the nature-nurture, right-
wing/left-wing constructs do not completely over-
lap. There are many cases of persons who write
allegedly 'conservative' pieces on the nature of
society and whose assumptions about the individ-
ual are environmental. Durkheim's collective
determination of the psychological concepts of
time and space is one such example. On the other
hand. Marx's dictum 'from each according to his
ability, to each according to his needs' can be
crudely interpreted as presenting a view of the
individual who at birth has certain fixed, fairly
unalterable abilities,
What I propose to do in this paper is to examine
the inferences which can and cannot be drawn
from the statistics presented in the debate. Sec-
ondly. I wish to draw attention briefly to elements
of arguments about intelligence in society which
often remain submerged. and finally, to suggest
a few implications which lQ statistics have for
developing countries.
The array of data surrounding the nature-nurture
controversy is vast. I have already referred to the
two key concepts in the debate. 'heritability' and
'variance'. Variance refers to the total amount of
variation of scores on IQ tests among a given
population. This total variance is regarded by
Jensen and population statisticians as the sum
of three main components. each contributing their
own amount of variance: genetic factors, environ-
mental factors and error factors. The proportion
of the total variance due to heredity factors is
referred to as the 'heritability coefficient'. or
'heritability'.
I-tow then is a heritability coefficient computed?
For a large number of pairs of individuals (always
of the same kinship relation) the test results of
one of the pair are correlated with the results of
the others. The kinship relation usually regarded
as the most reliable source of data is the mono-
zygous twin relationship. (Two persons developed
from a split zygote (egg), and therefore in theory
having the same gene structure or genotype.)
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Where monozygous twins have been reared apart,
the proportion of variance in test scores due to
environmental factors can be computed.
Once the heritability coefficient is derived though,
the figure is often given a number of erroneous
meanings. The statistical concept of variance
defined above refers to the total amount of varia-
tien between individuals, or, to be more specific
in this case, the sum of the differences between
the scores of each person in a pair of monozygotic
twins. We are looking at differences between
individuals. The famous heritability figure of 80
per cent is often misinterpreted to mean the pro-
portion of any given individual's total develop-
ment which can be accounted for by genetic
factors. This i nonsense. Heritability is a popu-
lation statistic. It operates at a level beyond the
individual. Jensen makes this point clear:
"heritability ... has no sensible meaning with
reference to a measurement or characteristic
in an individual. A single measurement by defi-
nition, has no variance. There is no way of
partitioning a given individual's IQ into heredity
and environmental components . .
(Jensen 1969 p. 42).
Now it may be possible to make probability
statements about the proportion of a difference
between two individuals attributable to genetic or
environmental factors, but it is impossible to take
one individual and to attribute a certain propor-
tion of his total development to genetic or en-
vironmental factors, even on a probability basis.
It is theoretically possible that a population of
individuals might yield a heritability value of 90
per cent whereas the actual genetic proportion
of any given individual's total development (not
that we could ever measure it) might only be 10
per cent. Heritability refers only to the differences
between individuals, and such differences may
actually represent a very small proportion of an
individual's total development.
We can take as an analogy the concept of group
cohesion, which refers to the degree of 'together-
ness' displayed by a group of persons. A group in
which the individual members displayed little
mutual attraction would be lacking in group
cohesion. Now an index of group cohesion might
allow us to state the probable degree of mutual
attraction between two members of the group,
but it would be meaningless to use this index to
make a statement about the internal cohesion or
integrity of an individual. Again this would be
impossible, even on a probability basis. Indeed, a
group may well be cohesive precisely because the
people who comprise it are lacking individual
integrity. In short, heritability is a statistic beyond
the level of the individual and it cannot be used
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to support a statement about the proportion of an
individual's total development attributable to
genetic or environmental factors.
A second characteristic of heritability is its depen-
dence on the sampled population. Heritability is
an empirically determined population statistic,
and like any statistic its value is affected by the
characteristics of that population. Heritability
will be higher in a population iñ which environ-
mental variation relevant to the trait in question
is small than in a population in which there is
great environmental variation. This raises ques-
tions about the limits of a population and the
generalizability of the twin samples to a popula-
tion. If we are to apply the dictum that herita-
bility coefficients apply only to the population
sampled, then it is tempting to conclude that
coefficients derived from separated twin studies
apply only to the total population of separated
twins. This may be taking the point too far but
the separated twin studies are most certainly not
representative of, for example, the black popula-
tion. The significance of this is realized when we
see how Jensen uses a heritability estimate, from
a North American white sample to explain the
15-point inter-group difference between the
average IQ scores of a large white population and
a large black population. To my knowledge a
heritability estimate has never been calculated for
a sample representing the total black North
American population. Suppose for example, a
heritability coefficient were computed and turned
out to be as low as 20 per cent for the black
population. How then would we explain the 15-
point difference? Why should we use the coefficient
of 80 per cent rather than the other coefficient of
20 per cent to explain the difference? The only
way to compute the proportion of variance be-
tween blacks and whites attributable to genetic
factors would be to include a study of white
monozygotic twins raised in separate black en-
viroments, and a study of pairs of one white/one
black monozygotic twins. The former situation is
unlikely, given present social constraints, and the
latter is a genetic impossibility.
Not only are estimates of heritability specific to
the population sampled but they are also specific
to the particular tests used, the method of measure-
ment and the particular point in time. Jensen
himself presents data to show how heritability
estimates depend on the intelligence test used.
Estimates varied from 0.42, when a Swedish IQ
test was used, to 0.80 when the Stanford Binet
test was used.2 The relevance of the method of
2 While Jensen demonstrates that heritability depends on the
test used, Jencks shows how the type of heritability
coefficient used determines the result. When different
heritability formulae are applied to the same data the co-
efficients may vary from 0.60 to 0.91. (Jencks 1972 p. 294).
measurement has been revealed in several studies
which demonstrate the interpersonal and expect-
ancy effects of the testing situationwhite testers
record scores from black subjects significantly
lower than those obtained when a black person
does the testing; results from twins are closer
when tested by the same psychologist than when
each is tested by a different psychologist. The
dependence of a heritability coefficient on a point
in time reminds us of the heritability estimates
for behaviour characteristics in animals, which
have been found to increase, decrease and fluc-
tuate randomly as a function of repeated testing.3
Although IQ tests have themselves been tested
repeatedly on humans in order to select out items
that are inconsistent over time, I do not know of
any study which actually makes repeated herita-
bility estimates on the same population over fairly
small intervals (say one day). So much, then, for
the reliability of heritability.
My second set of points is about how IQ data
relate to other social indicators within a society.
Studies showing the positive intercorrelation of
intelligence test scores, educational achievement
and social economic status, are numerous (Blau
and Duncan 1967, Jencks 1972). Scores are often
grouped together by socio-economic class and we
see that the highest status group has on average
the highest IQ score.
Such data are often used to support political
arguments: those of higher status are the most
capable members of society and therefore deserve
their rewards; society would be run more efficiently
if we ensured that all those obtaining high IQ
scores were allocated to high status positions; there
are certain jobs in society which require scarce
mental abilitiés etc. The 'use of such data in these
arguments overlooks a number of aspects of the
relationship between data on IQ and social class.
The range of scores within a class is often greater
that the differences between classes. Intelligence
tests usually favour the group on which the test
is standardized initially (in the case of the most
widely used test, the Stanford Binet, this was a
white middle-class sample). The most frequently
used validation criterion for intelligence tests is
school success, i.e. if we want to know whether
a test measures what we intended it to measure,
we compare a group of individuals results with
their results on another measure. When intelli-
gence tests were first developed this second
measure was school success. Now it is usually
another intelligence test which itself was validated
3 Studies in animals which show the dependence of heritability
on a point in time, are quoted in J, Hirsch (1970). This
article also provides further comment on the misuse of the
heritability satístic.
against school success at some point. Therefore,
it is not surprising to find that IQ correlatés with
school success which itself correlates with job
success and socio-economic background.
These political arguments advance a 'realized
potential' concept of intelligence. The higher
social strata comprise those who, on average, have
higher IQ scores. Certain occupational roles tend
to be performed by people in these strata. There-
fore, certain minimum levels of intelligence are
necessary to perform these jobs. But this argu-
ment is valid only if we assume that everyone
develops to his full potential at some point in his
life and continues to express it. Only if this is
true can we argue that those performing occupa-
fions of lower status and having lower IQs are
incapable of performing higher status occupations,
and performing them just as efficiently.
Now this sort of assumption is difficult to prove
either way. However, we can depend on human
intuition to refute it and to remind us of the scores
of schoolmates whose talents appear to have been
wasted as they dropped into one of society's
slots; the creativity of very young chiidrens'
thoughts and actions which convention deems it
necessary to curb; the wealth of thoughts and
actions of the older generation which were per-
haps once expressed but are now inhibited by
Western society's expectation that old people
make only negative contributions. It is unlikely
that many people realize their full potential. The
majority of people operate below their maximum.
Ultimately, genetic constraints may become appar-
ent, but the overwhelming and more immediate
constraints in the present world are man-made----
the constraints of political, social and economic
systems. The 'realized potential' concept of intel-
ligence provides its own proofpeople (and
perhaps societies) who interpret failure in terms
of their own inherent lack of ability are unlikely
to invest effort in improving themselves. While
it is unlikely that the majority of people ever
realize their full potential, a social concept of
intelligence which implies further constraints
ensures that they never will.
A step towards testing the assumption about
realized potential might be made if certain social
institutions were prepared to undertake social
experiments. For example, an employing organi-
zation could undertake (perhaps with a risk-
taking monetary guarantee for both employer
and employee) an experiment in which a
number of persons of widely differing intelli-
gence levels perform the same job. Universities
might evaluate the performance. of students
admitted on a lottery basis, irrespective of educa-
tional background. (While University teaching
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staff might evaluate the students, the admissions
policy would need to be concealed lest their
academic prejudices colour their perceptions and
grading of students.)
Some implications for developing countries of IQ
statistics should now be becoming clear. R is
sometimes argued that certain countries are 'under-
developed' because their populations are of lower
intellect than those of the developed world. The
points elucidated earlier about heritability esti-
mates and the differences between racial groups
cannot be overstated. lt is possible to demonstrate
that one racial group in society performs at an
inferior level on an lQ test, hut we must remember
that the group which devises and administers the
test invariably comes out on top. it is also possible
to correlate differences between societies or racial
groups on some measure of economic develop-
ment (e.g. income distribution) with differences
on a measure of intellectual development (e.g.
average IQ score). We can even make the bold
assumption that a causal arrow runs from inteliec-
tuai development to economic development, and
attempts to explain economic differences in terms
of intellectual differences. But we will never he
able to explain the intellectual differences in terms
of either genetic or environmental factors. To
explain differences betw,een societies requires a
number of activitiesthe co-operative develop-
ment of' an intelligence test which would reveal
differences between the average performances of
the groups who designed it, and the computation
of a heritability estimate which would apply across
countries or racial groups. As explained above.
in the case of blacks and whites this would involve
a number of impractical combinations of environ-
ment and genotype.
Undoubtedly there are genetic upper limits to the
activities of human beings and societies, but it is
Linlikely that such limits will ever be reached. To
blame an individual or society's shortcomings
on 'inherent' lack of ability is an easy way out. lt
i; always more difficult, but probably more honest.
to accept that such shortcomings are man-made
rather than made in man.
A second set of implications of IQ statistics con-
cerns their use as a social technology. Many
developing countries are in the process of develop-
ing local IQ and aptitude teSts for a variety of
purposes. e.g. educational and occupational selec-
tion. The development of local lQ tests some-
times means simply changing the content of
American or British tests to fit local conditions.
Alternatively, tests may he built up from scratch
by indigenous or Western psychologists. But in
such cases the process of test construction--item
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selection, test validation, standardization etc.is
the same as in the West. The influence of the US
educational testing service is very apparent in
many developing countries.
Now there is nothing wrong with a developing
country deciding to import a process which has
been developed in the West (even if it does con-
tain implicit assumptions): what is wrong it to
import a process which does not explicitly state
its assumptions. One such assumption is that the
distribution of intelligence follows a normal curve.
Many psychologists in the West, forgetful of their
own assumptions, write as though IQ scores are
actually distributed normally, but in fact the
normal distribution of lQ scores is nothing more
than a statistical artefact: items are selected and
rejected according to whether or not the total
scores for a large population follow a normal
distribution. On this point Vernon (1960) has
written: "it is practically impossible to prove that
mental abilities are normally distributed. But
there is no logical reason, nor any strong evidence,
for suggesting any other type of distribution.
Psychologists have accepted this dogma since it
provides a convenient basis for test construction
and for statistical analysis of test scores". Another
related assumption in the use and construction of
JO tests is that the standard deviation of IQ scores
on a good test should be 15 points either side of
the mean score of 100. The standard deviation
refers to the range of scores which accounts for
approximately 68 per cent of the population of
IQ scores. When the standard deviation is 15
points. 68 per cent of the scores should fall within
the range 85 to lIS points. Now there seems to
he no obvious reason why a population of lQ
scores should not have a standard deviation of
20 points of 5 points instead of 15. All this means
is that the shape of the distribution would be more
or less flattened. The flatness of a distribution
will he determined by the degree to which testers
choose to discriminate between people.4
Intelligence testing as a social technology provides
a useful tool for allocating persons to jobs. It
also adds 'scientific fact' to the legitimation of any
process which has to allocate people to slots in
an unequal economic and social structure. The
difference between allocation on the basis of
criteria like class or race on the one hand, and
intelligence on the other is that intelligence, given
scientilic credence. may be more resistant to
change in the future than class or race have been
in the past.
4 For comprehensive accountS of the contruction of intel(oence
tests, see Ohuche and Akeju (1975). Ryan (1973) and Simon
(1971).
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